Philosophy: What does it mean to know?

The concept of “knowing” is central to many fields, from philosophy to everyday life. There are multiple senses in which we use the verb “to know,” and this distinction has been the subject of much philosophical reflection. Let’s focus on the “knowledge of facts” (sense 1), a topic that has generated intense discussion since the time of Socrates.

The Standard Model: Justified True Belief (JTB)

The justified true belief (JTB) theory of knowledge has been the dominant account for much of Western philosophy. According to this theory, in order to “know” a fact, the following three conditions must be met:

Belief: You must believe the proposition (e.g., you believe it is three o’clock in the afternoon).
Truth: The proposition must be true (i.e., it actually is three o’clock).
Justification: You must be justified in believing it (you have some reason or evidence for your belief, such as checking the clock).

Pros of JTB

Intuitive Appeal: JTB fits well with our everyday intuitions about knowledge. If someone tells you that they know something, we typically expect them to believe it, have reasons for their belief, and for the belief to be true.
Clear Structure: It offers a simple, clear framework for evaluating what constitutes knowledge. By focusing on belief, truth, and justification, it provides a direct way of analyzing whether someone “knows” something.
Foundation for Epistemology: The theory provides a solid foundation for many debates in epistemology, offering a starting point for analyzing and refining what knowledge is.

Cons of JTB

Gettier Problem: The most significant challenge to JTB came in 1963 when philosopher Edmund Gettier published his famous paper challenging the sufficiency of the JTB account. Gettier’s cases suggest that having justified true belief is not always sufficient for knowledge. The example of Albert and the faulty clock is a classic illustration. Even though Albert has justified belief (he believes it’s 3 o’clock based on the clock, and the clock is correct by coincidence), he doesn’t “know” it’s 3 o’clock because the justification (the faulty clock) is irrelevant to the truth. This leads to the conclusion that JTB may not capture the essence of knowledge after all.
The Need for a Fourth Condition: After Gettier, many philosophers have suggested that a fourth condition might be necessary to fully define knowledge. This fourth condition often involves “no luck” or “no epistemic luck”—in other words, the truth of the belief should not rely on luck. In Gettier’s case, Albert’s belief was justified, true, but it happened to be true purely by coincidence, not because of his justification. Thus, the belief was “lucky,” and he didn’t really know it. Some proposed additional conditions include “reliability”, “defeasibility”, or “no false grounds” for the belief.
Circularity of Justification: Another challenge to JTB is that the concept of justification is often questioned. What counts as sufficient justification? This question can lead to an epistemic regress problem, where each justification requires another justification, potentially leading to an infinite regress. Alternatively, one might appeal to foundational beliefs (self-evident truths), but this raises issues about which beliefs are foundational.

Expanding Beyond JTB: The Gettier Problem and Alternative Theories

In response to the Gettier problem, many philosophers have developed alternative theories of knowledge, sometimes adding conditions to JTB, sometimes entirely rethinking it.

1. No Luck Condition (Anti-Luck Epistemology)

This approach aims to ensure that a belief is not true simply by chance or luck. For example, Albert in the Gettier case would not be said to know the time because his belief was justified but was true purely by luck (due to the faulty clock). A no-luck condition would demand that the justification be directly linked to the truth, rather than coincidental.

Pros: It fixes the key problem posed by Gettier’s counterexamples. By ruling out luck, it helps refine our understanding of “knowledge.”
Cons: The distinction between luck and non-luck can be subtle and difficult to pin down. Moreover, some critics argue that this additional layer of complexity may overly complicate the concept of knowledge.

2. Reliabilism

Reliabilism suggests that a belief counts as knowledge if it is produced by a reliable cognitive process—one that generally leads to true beliefs. Under this view, justification is no longer tied to the believer’s reasons or evidence; rather, it depends on the reliability of the method used to form the belief. For instance, if you believe it is three o’clock because you used a trustworthy clock, this belief might count as knowledge, even if the clock happened to be faulty in a specific instance.

Pros: This approach helps overcome some of the problems of justification that plague JTB. It emphasizes the process by which beliefs are formed, rather than focusing solely on whether beliefs are justified by evidence.
Cons: Reliabilism has its own challenges. Critics argue that it might allow “knowing” things without proper understanding. For example, if a person gets a correct answer by guessing, their belief might be true and reliable, but it’s unclear whether they “know” the answer. Furthermore, it struggles with cases of epistemic luck.

3. Virtue Epistemology

Virtue epistemology emphasizes the intellectual virtues of the person holding the belief—such as open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and careful reasoning. According to this view, knowledge is a matter of having true beliefs that are the result of the exercise of intellectual virtues.

Pros: It offers a more human-centered approach to knowledge, focusing on the intellectual character of the person rather than abstract conditions like justification or reliability. This might align better with our intuitions about knowing something as an active, skillful process.
Cons: This view can be criticized for being too vague. Intellectual virtues are complex, and it’s not always clear what constitutes virtuous belief-formation in all situations. It also risks falling back into a form of JTB if the intellectual virtues are linked to justification.

Controversial Views on Knowledge and Facts

Some philosophers, particularly relativists and constructivists, argue that knowledge is not a matter of discovering objective facts but rather a process of constructing beliefs within particular social or cultural frameworks. From this view:

Pros: This approach takes seriously the role of culture, language, and perspective in shaping what we consider knowledge. It challenges the assumption that there is an objective, unchanging reality that we can access in the same way across all contexts.
Cons: Relativism is often criticized for undermining the possibility of objective truth. If all knowledge is socially constructed, then how can we distinguish between better and worse beliefs? Does this mean that facts like the Earth being round are just “opinions” subject to personal or cultural bias?

Conclusion: What Does It Mean to “Know” a Fact?

The question of what it means to “know” a fact is not easily answered, and the debate continues to evolve. The traditional Justified True Belief model offers an intuitive starting point, but the Gettier problem and other challenges suggest that there may be more to knowledge than merely believing something that is true for good reasons. Alternative theories such as reliabilism, virtue epistemology, and anti-luck epistemology provide valuable refinements, but each has its own limitations.

Ultimately, the question of what constitutes knowledge may not have a single, definitive answer. Philosophers will continue to refine and debate these theories, especially as they consider the implications of skepticism, relativism, and the nature of truth itself.